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INTRODUCTION 
 
A few days following an election, the size of the cabinet soon comes to the 
forefront. Politicians, journalists, and electoral pundits not only speculate about who 
will be in charge of the ministries, the gender composition or the presence of 
minorities, but also debate intensively about the number of ministerial posts. This is 
rapidly subjected to political scrutiny. For instance, an opposition party defined the 
2015 Andalusian regional cabinet as a prime minister’s ‘fan club’ since the new 
single-party cabinet was larger than the previous two-party coalition government 
(Torres 2015).  
Although the number of ministries soon becomes a hot public debate, political 
science studies have devoted few efforts to understand it. While administration size 
and government formation processes have been widely scrutinised, cabinet size has 
attracted less attention. On an attempt to change this pattern, Indriðason and Bowler 
(2014) recently explored the determinants of executive size by analysing Western 
European countries between 1944 and 2015. They concluded that coalition 
governments, the size of the legislature and ideological cohesiveness among cabinet 
members are significant factors associated with larger national cabinets (see also 
Verzichelli 2008).  
This article extends these recent insights and focuses on how multilevel dynamics 
shape regional cabinet size. Our goal is not simply to replicate previous analysis at the 
subnational arena: we argue that the multilevel structure of power brings about 
different theoretical expectations that can explain cross-regional variation in cabinet 
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size. More concretely, we focus our analysis on three factors. First, we study the 
effect of decentralisation on regional cabinet size and, more specifically, whether 
some forms of decentralisation lead to larger cabinets than others. Second, we test 
whether multilevel (in)congruence has a significant effect on the number of 
portfolios. While some approaches argue that administrations governed by the same 
party(ies) remove constraints to modify cabinets, others suggest that multilevel 
incongruence can lead to bigger cabinets as regional governments will have incentives 
to have more portfolios in order to signal distinctive policy preferences. Finally, we 
speculate that nationally-distinct regions will have larger cabinets as they will tend to 
‘mirror’ some of the state functions by creating more ministerial posts. 
Our hypotheses are tested with a new dataset built on the Spanish case. Since the 
establishment of its democratic constitution in 1978, Spain initiated a large and 
progressive process of decentralisation. Twelve out of seventeen Autonomous 
Communities (ACs) voted for the first time in a regional election in 1983, which led 
them to establish their first democratic regional cabinets. Differences across regions 
on their institutional capacity, the number and nature of competences they hold, the 
diverse government congruence situations and the existence of subnational identities 
turn Spain into a suitable case for analysis. 
Results show that only welfare state competences have a significant positive 
influence on regional cabinet size, especially when region’s economic capacity is 
high. Acs tend to have larger cabinets at high values of welfare state competences and 
regional economic capacity. Findings also indicate that congruence seems to reduce 
regional cabinet size ―although results are not conclusive. Finally, nationally-distinct 
regions tend to have larger cabinets. 
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The article is organised as follows.  The next section reviews the literature on 
cabinet size variations. This section serves as a backdrop to focus on regional 
executives and develop the theoretical arguments for why regional cabinet size may 
change. The following section presents the data and, later, we discuss the statistical 
results. The article ends with a summary of the main findings and suggestions for 
future research.
1
 
 
WHY DOES THE SIZE OF THE CABINET CHANGE? 
Although cabinet size goes back to Aristotle who highlighted the relevance of the 
number of people in charge of government, one of the first analytical explanations 
was provided in Parkinson’s Law, and Other Studies in Administration (Parkinson 
1957). Parkinson stated that cabinets begin at an ‘optimal’ size and then successively 
enlarge, first in order to overcome a problem of hidden information and, at a second 
stage, in order to appease the different factions of a party (Parkinson 1957, chap.4).
 
Based on Parkinson’s ideas, Klimek et al. (2009) analysed cross-national data from 
197 worldwide cabinets, descriptively showing that cabinet sizes ranged from five 
(Liechtenstein and Monaco) to fifty-four (Sri Lanka) and that size was negatively 
correlated with indicators related to political stability or effectiveness.  
Hitherto, the specialised literature has understood that the relevance of studying 
cabinet size stems from the consequences executive size has on different outcomes. 
The consistent finding among scholars is that the number of ministries is a good 
predictor of governments’ budget or public deficits (Woo 2003). Similarly, based on 
the idea that divisions within political institutions lead to inefficiency in public 
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spending, Wehner (2010) highlighted that the number of ministers in coalition 
cabinets increases budget figures. 
Besides the fiscal consequences, scholars have aimed to explain cabinet 
composition and structure. Although cabinet size is seldom taken as an outcome, the 
literature offers relevant insights to understand under what circumstances cabinets are 
larger or smaller. A relevant approach comes from the idea that political 
fragmentation leads to bigger governments. Previous research has shown that 
cabinets’ composition (especially coalitions) are strongly linked to their parliamentary 
support (Laver and Shepsle 1996). This dependency is mainly based on Gamson’s 
law: political parties are allocated portfolios proportional to their contribution to the 
legislative support,
2
 with the size of the cabinet being an important factor during the 
bargaining process (Gamson 1961; Martin and Vanberg 2003). Similarly, Verzichelli 
(2008) showed that ministry allocation is more proportional when parties have similar 
bargaining power.
 
 
Another approach has pointed out that political calculations and different policy 
preferences among parties drive most of the cabinet reorganisations, which in turn 
tend to affect the size of the executive (Davis et al. 1999). Heppell (2011), for 
instance, details how intra and interparty politics shaped the size of Labour cabinets in 
the UK, since different factions of the party demanded representation in the cabinet. 
However, not only politics, but also policies, shape the size of cabinets, since parties 
in cabinet can use different ministerial portfolios to emphasise policy preferences in 
order to set their political agenda (Mortensen and Green-Pedersen 2015). Finally, 
administrative considerations play a significant role. Having more or less ministerial 
offices has been linked to the unsatisfactory performance of existing departments, 
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which triggers internal reorganisations and different ministerial arrangements (White 
and Dunleavy 2010).  
Finally, the study of cabinet size recently took a significant step forward. 
Indriðason and Bowler (2014) attempted to understand why some countries have a 
larger or smaller cabinet by adopting a cross-country, over-time perspective, and 
analysing variation in national cabinet size in 17 Western European countries between 
1944 and 2005. They found evidence that executives tend to grow over time and tend 
to be bigger under left-wing governments, when coalition partners are less 
ideologically diverse and under minority cabinets. Their conclusions echoed 
Verzichelli’s (2008) previous findings, who highlighted the role of the number of 
parties, bargaining power, polarisation and the powers of the prime minister in 
explaining the size of the executive.  
 
CABINET SIZE IN A MULTILEVEL PERSPECTIVE 
Notwithstanding these recent significant contributions, previous literature has not 
yet studied why some regions have a larger or smaller executive. Hence, this article’s 
main contention is that the dynamics set by a multilevel structure of government 
crucially shape the variation in regional cabinet size. 
The relocation of authority downward from central states has modified the way 
institutions are designed. Parties’ strategies change when there are different 
institutional layers (Thorlakson 2007) and both state and regional decision-making 
very often need to be implemented after negotiating, cooperating, coordinating or 
simply interacting with other governments; decentralisation changes the dynamics of 
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the political and the party system (Hooghe and Marks 2003; Balme et al. 1994; 
Alesina and Spolaore 1997; Wälti 2004).  
Thus, a gap remains in our theoretical understanding about cross-regional variation 
in cabinet size. Given a multilevel set-up, there are three reasons that might explain 
why some regions have larger or smaller cabinets than others. 
 
Decentralisation and region’s economic capacity 
The first expectation has to do with territorial decentralisation. In decentralised 
states, subnational units have gained a considerable amount of self- or/and shared-rule 
(Marks et al. 2008) and they are even able to monitor, control or contribute to some 
policies granted by the central government (Tatham 2013). The point of departure is 
that regional cabinets will be larger with the number of competences transferred to the 
region. Thus, regional cabinets will have more incentives to have more ministers in 
order to effectively embrace all newly transferred areas of government.  
Yet, decentralisation cannot be conceived as a one-dimensional concept, being 
instead an overarching concept that includes several dimensions (Marks et al. 2008). 
These different dimensions may affect cabinet size in a different way.  
The first dimension of territorial decentralisation refers to the region’s economic 
capacity. The region’s ability to govern is directly linked to how big the regional 
budget is, which in itself depends on economic decentralisation. The second 
dimension of decentralisation refers to the policy domains in which regional 
governments are able to legislate. These two dimensions do not always go hand in 
hand. Regions can have the legal ability to legislate in several areas (education, 
health, infrastructures…), but at the same time have a limited economic capacity. For 
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instance, in 1997 the Spanish Conservative cabinet lead by José María Aznar agreed 
to transfer a greater percentage of taxes to the ACs without linking this transfer to a 
substantive increase in most ACs’ competences. In turn, two years before, Felipe 
González’s Socialist government decided to decentralise about 10 new –albeit 
different– competences to almost all ACs without increasing each region’s economic 
capacity.  
Substantively, the logic behind the effect of economic or political decentralisation 
on regional cabinet size can be different. Those regions with a higher economic 
capacity can build newer or greater institutional arrangements that can ultimately 
result in new ministerial posts. Having more resources may imply a more ambitious 
agenda or designing policies in areas otherwise left behind. On the other hand, 
political decentralisation may also give regions more room for institutional 
manoeuvre. It may provide the regional executive with political incentives to 
prioritise certain policy areas by creating new ministerial posts.  
Finally, it is reasonable to argue that having more ministerial posts may be 
associated with more political competences when region’s economic capacity is also 
high (interactive effect). This process is linked to an extensive debate in fiscal 
federalism on whether economic decentralisation facilitates or impedes the growth of 
the public sector. Scholars have shown that different conditions, such as government’s 
ideology, the degree of region’s jurisdictional capacity, or the constitutional or 
political constraints imposed to central governments (Rodden 2002; Baskaran 2011; 
Sorens 2014), modify the effect of economic decentralisation on the size of the public 
sector.  
Drawing from these insights, it is plausible to expect that a higher economic 
capacity without a broad set of policy domains may not justify the creation of new 
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ministerial posts: regions will have incentives to improve existing policies rather than 
tackling areas for which they have no real competences. Conversely, regions with 
greater political power without more economic resources may be less likely to have 
more ministerial posts, since its creation would imply a large sum of indirect expenses 
(offices, personnel, etc.). Hence, the impact of political decentralisation on cabinet 
size is expected to be large when economic capacity is high —that is, regions can 
cover the costs of new ministerial posts, which cover new policy domains. Indeed, it 
is less costly for regional incumbent politicians to justify larger cabinets when the 
region has both more competences and a greater regional budget.    
It is important to highlight that not only economic and political decentralisation are 
different dimensions, but also that the latter is not, in itself, a monolithic concept. 
Political decentralisation encompasses different policy domains. Indeed, Falcó-
Gimeno (2014) showed that decentralisation can take different forms, from welfare 
state issues, environmental issues or basic state functions (see also Chaqués and Palau 
2011). 
Overall, there are some insights to expect that only certain types of political 
decentralisation may be associated with larger cabinets. For instance, Chaqués and 
Palau (2011) show that some Spanish regions have frequently legislated on issues 
related to welfare state policies (health, education, social issues…). This may indicate 
that these regions give higher priority to these areas, which can ultimately result in 
creating a ministerial post specific to them.  
Following the previous theoretical reasoning, we expect the following: 
H1a: The greater the region’s economic capacity, the larger the regional cabinet 
size. 
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H1b: The greater the political decentralisation a region holds, the larger its cabinet 
size.     
H1c: The effect of political decentralisation on regional cabinet size will be 
stronger in regions with a larger economic capacity. 
 
Multilevel government congruence 
According to the endogenous decentralisation literature (Filippov et al. 2004), 
political parties at the regional level, and even regional branches of national parties, 
are influenced by decentralisation (Hopkin 2003). They tend to adopt discourses more 
directed towards the defence of regional interests (Thorlakson 2006) and are 
oftentimes engaged in a process of legislative bargaining over a region’s level of self- 
or shared-rule (Riker 1964; Amat and Falcó-Gimeno 2014; Guinjoan and Rodon 
2014). Also, multilevel politics influence parties’ incentives to support (or not) 
government formation at the regional level, conditional on the decentralisation status 
and the parliamentary support of the cabinets (Deschouwer 2009; Falcó-Gimeno and 
Verge 2013).  
The insights from the endogenous decentralisation literature can be translated to 
regional cabinet size. When governments are non-congruent across territorial levels, 
regional governments may have more incentives to increase the number of ministers 
in order to signal their political preferences and gain political or electoral advantage. 
For instance, in 2001 the Andalusian Socialist government created the Ministry of 
Work and Technological Development in order to signal that the regional government 
was investing more than the central cabinet (held by the conservatives) in 
employment policies and R&D. On a similar vein, Chaqués and Palau (2011) 
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conclude that, in a multilevel system like Spain, law agendas across levels of 
government are more similar when the same political party is governing at the 
national and regional levels, while being more diverse when parties are different.  
This is not, however, the only theoretical expectation. Previous literature has 
argued that vertical congruence (the coincidence of the party composition of 
government across levels) can facilitate intergovernmental relationships and, as such, 
regional governments may be less constrained to organise their cabinets. Bolleyer and 
Bytzek (2009) documented how low congruence across levels of government 
complicates intergovernmental relations, which in itself is an obstacle for subnational 
cabinets to implement their policies. In addition, incongruence has been associated 
with stalemate in those policy areas which necessitate joint decision-making between 
the centre and the regions (Hough and Jeffery 2006). The quest for congruence has 
played an important role in shaping the Spanish regional agenda and it has influenced 
national parties in their strategies when deciding whether to support a regional 
government, especially when the central government was a minority one (Ştefuriuc 
2009). 
These two contradictory expectations are summarised as follows: 
  
H2a:  Regional cabinet size will be larger when the parties in regional and national 
governments are different.  
H2b: Regional cabinet size will be larger when the same party, or parties, govern at 
both the regional and the national government.  
 
Nationally-distinct regions 
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The third expectation considers the relationship between subnational communities 
and regional cabinet size. Culturally, peripheral groups are a magnet for regional 
authority and therefore predisposed to demand self-rule. Not surprisingly, demands 
for autonomy by regional units that have national traits (distinct language, culture, 
and tradition) are generally higher (Marks et al. 2008). In those countries where some 
regions have a significant (and territorially concentrated) portion of the population 
with a different identity, controversies over the most appropriate territorial model are 
a common feature of party competition. Many nationally-distinct peripheral 
governments seek to ‘mirror’ some of the state functions and areas of influence, even 
if they have not formally been granted with the competence to act upon it. For 
instance, in the 2015 Catalan cabinet a new portfolio for Foreign Relations was 
created despite that the competences for ACs to engage in international relations were 
quite limited.  
Following this logic, we expect cabinet size to be greater in nationally-distinct 
regions, as compared to the other regional governments:  
 
H3:  In nationally-distinct regions cabinet size will be larger than in the other 
regions.  
 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
In order to study the effect of political multilevel dynamics on cabinet size we 
consider Spain to be a suitable case due to its political and historical characteristics. 
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The Spanish decentralisation process has been evolving since its inception, which is 
reflected in over-time and cross-regional differences. Also, the existence of different 
historical realities, regional party systems, and different timing for elections will 
allow us to test the hypotheses of political congruence and historically-distinct 
regions. All in all, the cross-regional diverse patterns of decentralisation and the 
characteristics detailed below make Spain a suitable case to test our hypotheses.  
The Spanish Constitution was approved in 1978 but it was not until 1982–1983 
that most of the regions passed a statute (or regional basic law) and conducted 
elections ―except for the regional governments that complied with the ‘fast-track’ 
requirements plus Andalusia.
3
 According to all regional statutes, the regional prime 
minister has the legal authority to designate the regional ministers, who in turn may or 
may not necessarily be members of the regional chamber (only the Prime Minister 
needs to have a seat in the parliament). In four ACs (Asturias, Canary Islands, 
C.Valenciana and Madrid) there was in a certain period a legal limit of 10 ministerial 
posts (C.Valenciana and Madrid) or 11 (Canary Islands and Asturias). Only the 
Canary Islands region still retains this legal requirement. There is no legal impediment 
in the remainder to create as many ministerial positions as they deem necessary. In 
addition, in some of the new regional statutes approved in the 2000’s, a 40% gender-
quota in the cabinet was introduced.  
The regions have had a fair amount of flexibility in order to design the region’s 
institutional and administrative structure, and have been legally able to change or 
adapt it according to their political preferences (Keating and Wilson 2009). Most 
ACs, however, have mimicked the central administrative structure despite having 
different levels of self-government. 
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Devolution in Spain can and does take different forms. The Spanish Constitution 
includes two types of competences, ones that are reserved exclusively for the central 
government (over the regulation of defence, foreign policy and trade, citizenship…) 
and others that can be transferred to the ACs. Regions can claim to exercise authority 
over a wide range of issues and may assume, therefore, competences in areas as 
diverse as public order, transport, environment protection, social assistance, health or 
education. However, decentralisation of competences is previously redefined and 
revised according to bilateral negotiations between the regional and the national 
government and, if a pact is reached, approved by Reales Decretos de Traspasos 
(Royal Transfer Decrees, hereafter RTDs). While the competences listed in regional 
statutes were gradually transferred, the distribution of political authority is flexible 
and negotiations can result in competence transfers that cover broad or narrow areas. 
In addition, the central government has the authority to halt decentralisation or even 
centralise power (Muro 2015). The Spanish territorial system is therefore open and 
malleable to political agreements. Ultimately, the bilateral nature of most of these 
transfers eventually allows the testing of how different levels and types of political 
decentralisation influence regional cabinet size.
4
  
For the empirical analyses, we focus on the 17 Spanish ACs over the time period 
1979 to 2015. We built a new dataset using data on regional cabinet size that was 
gathered from the yearbooks of the newspaper El País (1982–2011), the official 
gazettes of the ACs or from the official regional government web pages.
5
 Cabinet size 
is defined as the number of ministers in the regional government, with or without a 
portfolio
6
 and we have considered all regional cabinets since their first democratic 
election.
7
 Our dataset includes two types of cabinets: on one hand, those cabinets 
formed after regional elections, even if the composition did not change compared to 
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the previous year’s cabinet. On the other hand, we include any cabinet change during 
the legislative term, including cabinets emerging from changes in the partisan 
composition of the cabinet or, more frequently, reshuffles, since both can imply 
changes in cabinet size.
8
 Following previous literature, we consider a reshuffle to be 
“any change in ministerial personnel or responsibilities that affects more than two 
officeholders and at least two portfolios” (Indriðason & Kam 2008, p.329).  
Summary statistics for the dependent variables are summarised in  
Finally, it is important to note that most of the ACs’ first value is between 
1982/1983 and the majority of regions display cabinet size values every two years. 
Although the maximum legislative period required by law is four years, we observe 
122 reshuffles (43.4% of the observations), which on average take place in the second 
half of the parliamentary term.  
 and in Figure 1. They reflect an important variation of cabinet size, not only 
across the different ACs (11 ministers separate the smallest and the largest regional 
cabinets in Spain during the analysis period), but also within regions: in some cases, 
cabinet size in the final observed data is twice the size of the first observed value. 
Indeed, with few exceptions, regional cabinet size over time indicates a similar 
pattern across ACs. If we look at the cabinets from 1983, we can see for example that 
the Comunitat Valenciana and Aragón had a similar number of regional ministerial 
posts ―eight and seven respectively. However, twenty-four years later, after the 2007 
elections, both had experienced an increase in the number of ministerial posts: in the 
Comunitat Valenciana there were 14 ministers and 12 in Aragón. Meanwhile, in the 
same period, both Canary Islands and Extremadura have had (roughly) the same 
number of ministers (10) with just some minor variations. 
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Table 1: Cabinet size, summary statistics 
 N Mean Media
n 
Sd Min Max 
Post-electoral 
cabinets 
159 10.86 11 2.09 6 17 
Reshuffles 122 10.92 11 1.99 6 16 
By region       
Andalucía 17 12.88 12 1.87 10 16 
Aragón 19 10.16 10 1.61 7 13 
Asturias 15 10.27 11 1.39 7 12 
Balearic 
Islands 
17 12.35 13 1.76 8 15 
Canary 
Islands 
20 10.85 11 0.74 9 12 
Cantabria 15 8.73 9 1.62 6 11 
Castilla-La 
Mancha 
22 10.77 10 2.29 8 15 
Castilla-León 13 9.31 9 1.84 6 13 
Catalonia 15 14.07 14 1.39 12 17 
Comunitat 
Valenciana 
16 10.75 10 1.69 9 14 
Extremadura 13 10.33 10 1.44 7 12 
Galicia 16 11.87 12 1.71 9 15 
La Rioja 10 9.10 9 1.20 7 11 
Madrid 17 11.12 10.5 2.03 8 16 
Murcia 22 9.64 9.5 1.39 7 13 
Navarra 15 10.13 10 1.35 8 13 
Basque 
country 
16 12.12 11.5 1.75 9 15 
Total 281 10.89 11 2.09 6 17 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Size of regional cabinets by Autonomous Communities (1980-2015) 
 17 
 
The number of ministers is therefore relatively low in the beginning of the period 
(on average, regional governments were composed of 10.4 ministers in the early 
eighties) and it stabilises around 13 in the late 2000s. Just ‘eyeballing’ the graphs, we 
can see a time-trend pattern that roughly complies with Parkinson’s Law and with the 
trend showed by Indriðason and Bowler (2014): cabinets grew in the eighties and the 
early nineties and stabilised during the late nineties and 2000s. However, a look at the 
descriptive evolution also shows a general reduction in cabinet size over the last 
period, which portrays a slightly inverted U-shaped relationship. However, the 
decrease in cabinet size in the last years, which co-occurs with the economic crisis, is 
neither general nor systematic: some of the ACs kept their cabinet size and, in some 
others, cabinet size increases after the downward trend.   
Finally, it is important to note that most of the ACs’ first value is between 
1982/1983 and the majority of regions display cabinet size values every two years. 
Although the maximum legislative period required by law is four years, we observe 
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122 reshuffles (43.4% of the observations), which on average take place in the second 
half of the parliamentary term.  
As developed in the theoretical part, regional self-government generally 
encapsulates the dimensions of economic and political decentralisation. We measure 
the first dimension by employing the regional budget as an indicator of the region’s 
fiscal capacity.
9
 Regions have limited powers in designing and collecting their own 
taxes (Garcia-Milà and McGuire 2007) and most of their resources come from direct 
transfers from the central government. Thus, the regions’ budget is a good proxy for 
tackling regions’ economic capacity. The analyses include two different 
specifications: on the one hand, in order to control for differences in the first initial 
budget, we normalised the data so that each first regional budget is set to base 100. 
Since each regional government was set up, political and economic decentralisation 
has unfolded differently across regions, so the variable effectively measures the 
regional evolution in economic capacity. Since the distribution is right-skewed, we 
take the log of this variable—taking the log is also convenient for substantive reasons: 
the impact of the regional budget is likely to be larger at lower values than at the end 
of the distribution. On the other hand, we consider region’s per capita budget by 
calculating the budget over population ratio for each year and AC. 
In order to measure political decentralisation, we use Falcó-Gimeno’s (2014) 
dataset, in which political decentralisation is measured by calculating the cumulative 
number of competences transferred from the central government to the regional 
arenas over 19 different policy areas. Transferred competences may imply the 
capacity to legislate over certain policy areas –capacity to legislate on certain 
domains, executive means and financial resources– while others only imply the 
devolution of material resources or administrative procedures. In order to better 
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specify the type of transfers, we follow Chaqués and Palau (2011) and classify the 
transfers in different policy areas: a) basic state transfers for justice, civil rights or 
public administration policies, due to a nature of material transfers, and b) welfare 
state transfers for education, health, environmental or social policies. This distinction 
is necessary in order to capture the different nature of the RTD, and the different 
effect they might have on regional cabinet size.
10
  
The number of cumulative competences transferred varies both within and across 
regions and indicates how much political power each region formally has. Up until 
2015, Catalonia was the region where the number of transfers had been the highest 
(189), whereas Navarre was the lowest (60). In the empirical models we take the log 
of these indicators. The effect of the number of competences is likely to be non-linear, 
due to the nature of transferred competences. The first policy transfers in new policy 
areas can easily foster the creation of new ministerial posts, while the effect of 
posterior transfers is marginally lower, as new competences are more likely to be 
assumed by existing departments. 
Recall that the reason behind employing two different indicators on political 
decentralisation relies in the diverse nature of territorial decentralisation: while each 
region’s budget tackles the degree of regional economic capacity, the other variables 
attempt to capture the different policy areas of political decentralisation. Qualitative 
evidence of the diverse effects of political decentralisation on cabinet size drive the 
distinction between welfare and basic state competences. Two examples will suffice: 
in 1997 the executive of Castilla-La Mancha had the Ministry of ‘Culture and 
Education’. After the transfer of a substantive amount of competences on education 
(and, among them, the ability to manage 90.000 million pesetas), the executive 
government split the ministry into two new posts that separately focused on the areas 
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of Culture and Education. On the other hand, between 2000–2002 the Catalan 
executive received competences in Justice and Home Affairs (basic state functions) 
with a relatively low budget associated to it. This regional empowerment did not lead 
to new portfolios and, in fact, the regional executive decided to merge the Ministry of 
Justice with the Ministry of Home Affairs. The new administrative functions 
facilitated the coordination of public policies and, therefore, the regional executive 
considered that two separate ministries were no longer necessary.  
Any region can be endowed with political or administrative powers and, at the 
same time, its economic capacity can remain unaltered. This different logic is 
confirmed by the low correlation between the region’s budget and the cumulative 
transfers covering welfare state policies (0.12; p<0.05) or basic state functions (0.1; 
p>0.1). As developed in the theoretical part, we expect regional cabinets to be larger 
as either a function of the region’s economic capacity (H1a), political decentralisation 
(H1b) or when both interact (H1c).  
To test the effect of government congruence (H2) on regional cabinet size, we 
follow the categorisation made by Ştefuriuc (2009; 2013). Political congruence is 
defined as the presence of the same parties in both central and regional layers, which 
are supported by a majority of seats in parliament. Political incongruence occurs when 
the party(ies) are different in each level and both are majority cabinets. Partial 
congruence occurs when some of the parties are the same in both layers and any of 
the cabinets is a minority one, also if the ruling party in one layer supports the cabinet 
in the other layer of government. For instance, we would consider as partial 
congruence the Catalan cabinet from 1996–2000, since Convergència i Unió (CiU) –
i.e. the ruling party in Catalonia– supported the formation of a Popular Party (PP) 
minority cabinet in the central government and the PP supported CiU in Catalonia.
11
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Finally, we introduce a dummy for Catalonia, the Basque Country, Galicia and 
Navarre, versus the rest. The Spanish 1978 Constitution recognised the existence of 
‘cultural and national’ realities by implementing two ‘routes’ to accede autonomy, 
which allowed ‘historical nationalities’ – the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia – 
to assume the maximum level of competences granted to the regions at a much faster 
pace. In Spain, 55.1% of Catalans feel ‘only Catalan’ or ‘more Catalan than Spanish’, 
and a similar percentage is reported in the Basque Country (46.9%). Although in the 
Galician case the percentage is much lower (24.9%), the three are considered 
historical communities since their desire for regional autonomy dates back, at least, to 
the Spanish Second Republic (1931–1939). Catalonia, the Basque Country and 
Galicia followed a ‘fast-track’ process, while the rest engaged in a more-strict set of 
legal requirements. These historical nationally-distinct nations have designed policies 
to promote their own language, culture or traditions. For instance, in Catalonia, the 
Basque Country or Galicia the regional government soon built up a regional TV 
network that broadcasts in the region’s own language. Although Navarre was not 
strictly recognised as a historical nationality, it is usually included in the group of 
historical communities, since it has a larger degree of economic autonomy and also a 
distinct language and culture. Moreover, the percentage of the population identifying 
with Navarre (only or) rather than Spain was of 39.7% in 2015, even more than in 
Galicia.
12
 Recall that, according to H3, we should expect nationally-distinct ACs to 
have larger cabinets than the rest. 
Following Indriðason and Bowler’s article (2014) and Verzichelli (2008), we 
control for several significant factors associated with cross-country variations in 
cabinet size. In particular, we include: number of parties, ideology, majority status, 
being a reshuffle or not, population, and GDP growth.
13
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Table 2: Summary statistics of the main independent variables 
 N Min Max Mean Sd 
Regional budget 
growth (log) 
281 3.9 16.5 8.7 2.7 
Regional budget 
per capita 
280 .03 8720.13 1,947.17 1,669.88 
Cumulative 
number of welfare 
State competences 
(log) 
281 0 7.5 5.7 1.4 
Cumulative 
number of 
competences on 
State capacity (log) 
281 0 6.1 3.9 1.4 
Number of 
parties in the cabinet 
281 1 4 1.4 0.7 
GDP growth (t-1) 276 -5.6 17.5 3.5 3.7 
Years same PM 281 0 22 4.1 5.1 
Population 280 257,349 8,398,98
4 
2,487,68
8 
2,135,84
2 
Majority 66.5% are majority cabinets 
Leftist cabinets 43.42% are left-wing cabinets 
Mid-term cabinet 43.42% are mid-term cabinets 
Multilevel 
government 
congruence 
42.3% Full congruence: The same party(ies) govern(s) at the 
national and the regional level 
12.8% Partial congruence: Parliamentary support in the national 
and the regional level comes from different parties 
44.8% No congruence: A different party(ies) govern(s) at the 
national and the regional level 
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
The data we employ have a time-series-cross-section (TSCS) structure. As 
explained before, it consists of 17 ACs and the time-periods ranging between 1979 
and 2015. The distribution of our dependent variables by region and over time 
displays an intra-class correlation coefficient of 0.40, meaning that 40% of the 
variance is due to differences across panels.   
Given the type of data at hand, the methodology used here relies on conventional 
OLS regressions with year fixed-effects or a time-trend variable to control for 
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common temporal trends, since regional cabinets tend to grow over time (Indriðason 
and Bowler 2014). We also estimated other models as robustness. To account for 
autocorrelation in the data we first considered a model that included the lagged value 
of the number of cabinet posts among the regressors. We also ran a Panel-Corrected 
Standard Errors (PCSE) model in order to control for contemporaneous correlation 
across units and unit level heteroscedasticity. A final robustness test involves an 
extended dataset that includes one observation per AC and year since the first regional 
cabinet was formed (that is, 553 observations). Results, which can be found in the 
online appendix, are consistent across the different models.  
Table 3 presents the main results. M1 displays a basic model (M1), with the main 
variables and controls. M2 includes the interactions of interest. M3 controls for 
population, while M4 includes a time-trend control. M5 and M6 replace the logged 
regional budget for a per capita budget variable as an indicator of regional economic 
capacity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Regression models 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
Regional budget  
(base 100 - log) 
0.070 -1.150** -0.882* -1.410**   
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 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
 (0.048) (0.374) (0.353) (0.332)   
Regional budget  
(per capita) 
    -0.002* -0.002* 
     (0.001) (0.001) 
Cumulative # of Welfare 
State competences (log) 
1.180** 0.758+ 0.378 -0.206 0.905** 0.153 
 (0.321) (0.422) (0.401) (0.343) (0.344) (0.255) 
Cumulative # of Basic State 
competences (log) 
0.054 0.410 0.434 0.657+ 0.100 0.197 
 (0.187) (0.392) (0.368) (0.369) (0.220) (0.209) 
Welfare State Competences 
x Budget (log)  
 0.303* 0.219+ 0.368**   
  (0.122) (0.115) (0.111)   
Basic State Competences x 
Budget (log)   
 -0.158 -0.138 -0.221*   
  (0.109) (0.102) (0.102)   
Welfare State Competences 
x Budget (per capita)  
 
    0.001+ 0.001* 
     (0.000) (0.000) 
Basic State Competences x 
Budget (per capita)  
 
    -0.000 -0.000 
     (0.000) (0.000) 
Multilevel govt. congruence  
(no congruence ref. 
category) 
      
Partial congruence -0.479 -0.621 -0.674 -0.292 -0.368 0.040 
 (0.459) (0.454) (0.426) (0.353) (0.456) (0.364) 
Full congruence -0.033 -0.073 -0.108 -0.362 -0.038 -0.293 
 (0.246) (0.244) (0.229) (0.229) (0.250) (0.236) 
Nationally-distinct regions 1.220** 1.159** 1.048** 1.409** 1.392** 1.262** 
 (0.295) (0.290) (0.273) (0.269) (0.308) (0.295) 
Years as Prime Minister 0.075** 0.075** 0.081** 0.064** 0.083** 0.074** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) 
Single-party majority -0.293 -0.415 -0.578* -0.107 -0.359 0.065 
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 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
government 
 (0.303) (0.300) (0.283) (0.265) (0.300) (0.267) 
Mid-term cabinet -0.194 -0.110 0.034 0.315 -0.148 0.267 
 (0.308) (0.303) (0.285) (0.195) (0.305) (0.199) 
# parties in cabinet 0.526** 0.448* 0.542** 0.296+ 0.506** 0.407* 
 (0.184) (0.189) (0.178) (0.173) (0.183) (0.173) 
GDP growth t-1 0.084 0.114* 0.096+ 0.172** 0.094+ 0.189** 
 (0.055) (0.054) (0.051) (0.028) (0.054) (0.030) 
Leftist cabinets 0.566* 0.616** 0.336 0.715** 0.496* 0.593** 
 (0.237) (0.233) (0.223) (0.217) (0.238) (0.223) 
Population (std)   0.718** 0.649**  0.607** 
   (0.126) (0.129)  (0.115) 
Time trend    -0.053*  -0.061+ 
    (0.026)  (0.036) 
Constant 6.836** 8.210** 9.543** 8.825** 7.632** 7.928** 
 (1.342) (1.393) (1.326) (0.841) (1.374) (0.776) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
N 276 276 276 276 276 276 
ACs 17 17 17 17 17 17 
R
2
 0.53 0.55 0.60 0.48 0.54 0.46 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
 
The first substantive finding is that the regional budget is not significant in M1. 
Thus, regions with a greater regional budget do not have larger cabinets. Regarding 
the effect of decentralisation, the estimates show that decentralisation of welfare state 
competences has a statistically significant positive effect on regional cabinet size. 
Interestingly, though, decentralisation in the form of basic state functions did not have 
the same significant effect. As developed in the theoretical part, this result not only 
indicates the appropriateness to consider different dimensions for decentralisation, it 
also shows that those regions that hold more welfare state competences tend to have a 
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greater regional executive (H1b). On the contrary, when the region has a larger 
economic capacity (H1a) or more basic state function competences, regional cabinet 
sizes do not vary.  
Indeed, these results square with White and Dunleavy’s (2010) idea that welfare 
state competences imply an extension of policy functions leading to demergers or new 
start-up ministries, while basic state functions just imply transfer (or even mergers) of 
functions across ministries since the increase of material resources is mainly 
administrative – i.e. more material resources allow ministries to tackle diverse issues 
without creating new portfolios. Therefore, basic State function competences do not 
lead to bigger cabinets.
14
 
The substantive effect of cumulative welfare state competences granted to ACs 
(M4) is displayed in Figure 2, in which the effect of (the log of) the cumulative 
welfare state competences transferred to the region is plotted against predicted 
regional cabinet size, holding the rest of their variables at their means. As the figure 
shows, the effect is positive: for instance, regions in the first quartile have two 
ministers less than regions in the third quartile.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Predicted regional cabinet size as a function of the cumulative Welfare State 
competences transferred to the region 
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We also hypothesised that regional cabinets are larger when regions have both a 
high economic capacity and a large number of competences. Following this line of 
reasoning, M2-M6 include interactions between the region’s budget (with the two 
different specifications) and the number of welfare state competences, on one hand, 
and the number of basic state function competences, on the other. The first interaction 
is always positive and significant, while the second mostly reports a non-significant 
effect. Figure 3 plots the marginal effects of the first interaction (M4). The graph 
provides evidence that the effect of welfare state competence transfers on cabinet size 
is greater as the regional economic capacity increases. Thus, when regions hold more 
welfare state competences and have a high economic manoeuvrability, regional 
cabinet size tends to be larger. Conversely, for low values of regional budget, having 
more welfare competences has a non-significant effect.  
Figure 3: Marginal effect of cumulative Welfare State competences transferred to the 
region for different levels of regional budget 
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Next, we explore H2, which suggests that regional cabinet size is larger when both 
the regional and the central government are governed by different parties, providing 
incentives for the regional executive to increase the number of portfolios in their 
cabinets to signal distinct policy preferences (H2a); or when the same party governs 
both the regional and the central government, which facilitates intergovernmental 
relationships and institutional design (H2b). 
Despite all coefficients being negative, in none of our models multilevel 
congruence reaches statistical significance. In addition, we also calculated the 
difference between the incumbent ideological position on the central and the regional 
level as a proxy for diverse policy priorities across government arenas
15
. Results, 
which can be found in the online appendix, are also negative and not significant. 
However, multilevel congruence in our region-year panel data regressions (Table E in 
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the online Appendix) is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that ACs 
ruled by a different party (or parties) than the national incumbent tend to be larger. 
Nevertheless, results are not conclusive and it is not possible to rule out the possibility 
that non-significance in Table 3 is due to the simultaneous occurrence of the 
mechanisms described in H2a and H2b. 
Finally, the dummy that distinguishes nationally-distinct regions is significant and 
positive. This result indicates that nationally-distinct regions tend to have bigger 
cabinets than other regions. This finding goes in line with what we hypothesised in 
H3, which claimed that regions with national characteristics have a tendency to have 
larger regional cabinets.   
To illustrate the effects, Figure 4 plots the predicted cabinet size of nationally-
distinct regions versus the others, holding the other variables at their means (M4). 
Nationally-distinct regions tend to have, on average, two more ministerial posts than 
the rest. Some could argue that these differences might be due to larger differences 
between these two types of ACs in the early 1980s. In order to check that this is not 
the case, we performed T-tests dividing our sample into three different periods; the 
results (presented in Table 4) show that cabinets in nationally-distinct regions are 
always significantly larger, although differences decrease over time. 
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Figure 4: Predicted regional cabinet size in historical AC versus non-historical AC 
 
Table 4: Differences in cabinet size between historic and non-historic AC over time (T-tests) 
 
 <1990 1990-2000 >2000 
Historical 11.68 12.38 12.27 
Non-historical 9.82 10 11.22 
Difference 1.85*** 2.37*** 1.05* 
*** p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p>0.05 
 
Finally, if we focus our attention on the control variables we observe the 
following: the number of years the regional prime minister holds office is a positive 
and significant predictor of regional cabinet size. Even controlling for time-trends, 
twelve extra years in office (three terms) is associated with larger cabinet size by 
almost one minister. In regions where the number of parties in the cabinet is larger, 
the cabinet size is also greater, a result that squares with Indriðason and Bowler’s 
Non-historical AC
Historical AC
10 11 12
Predicted regional cabinet size
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findings (2014). Last but not least, having a leftist cabinet is associated with larger 
regional cabinets, by approximately one ministerial post. 
Interestingly, compared to Verzichelli’s (2008) findings that national executives 
tend to be smaller when the economy grows, in our models regional GDP growth is 
positive and statistically significant, which indicates that during good times central 
governments tend to shrink, while inflating the ministerial posts at the regional level. 
This finding reinforces the differential dynamics between regional and country 
cabinet structures. 
As compared to Indriðason and Bowler’s findings (2014), we do not find 
significant evidence that, at the regional level, the type of government (single-party 
government versus coalition) contributes to inflation of the number of ministers. 
Finally, reshuffles do not seem to be a tool for regional cabinets to enlarge.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Most of the countries in the world have a certain degree of regional authority. 
Decentralisation is increasingly in vogue. Over recent decades, due to economic or 
democratic incentives, devolving the responsibilities of centralised governments to 
regional or local governments has been a local trend. By doing so, decentralisation 
has changed the institutional and the party system: both need to coexist in a much 
more complex system of governance.  
Building on the complexity set-up by a multilevel territorial system and from the 
recent and stimulating findings of Verzichelli (2008) and Indriðason and Bowler 
(2014), we analysed the determinants of regional variation on cabinet size. We argue 
that there are compelling theoretical reasons to expect that some factors, linked to a 
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multilevel polity, could affect the size of the regional executive. In addition, these 
arguments are different in nature than what could affect national governments. Hence, 
we hypothesised that regional governments would be larger as a function of political 
and economic decentralisation, when there is (not) party congruence across national 
and regional executives and as a function of the existence of nationally-distinct 
regional groups.  
Results have confirmed that decentralisation matters, especially in the form of 
political decentralisation. Regions with a greater economic capacity do not 
automatically have a larger cabinet size. Instead, regions that have more welfare state 
competences have a greater number of portfolios, while basic administrative 
competences do not have a significant effect on regional cabinet size. The fact that 
welfare state competences matter, as compared to basic administrative competences, 
may highlight that regions use these new attributions to increase their visibility. The 
multilevel structure of government makes it difficult for citizens to distinguish which 
administration is in charge of certain policy areas, thus regional cabinets may use 
their new political attributions to signal certain domains and attract citizen’s attention.  
Most importantly, we also showed that the effect of welfare state competences on 
regional cabinet size is larger at high values of regional economic capacity. In other 
words, cabinet size is significantly larger when regions are granted with both welfare 
competences and a higher economic maneauvrability.  
Congruence/non-congruence between the national and the regional government 
received insufficient support. According to the literature, congruence can either 
facilitate coordination and therefore the creation of new portfolios or provide 
incentives for regional executives to signal policy preferences by creating new 
ministries. According to our analysis, congruence appears to reduce ACs cabinet size, 
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although results are only statistically significant in a region-year panel structure. 
Future research will have to dig deeper into this effect, by looking at a larger pool of 
countries and also testing whether (non-)congruence affects the design of specific 
policies, rather than the executive structure.   
The empirical analysis has also concluded that nationally-distinct regions, like 
Catalonia or the Basque Country, tend to have a larger number of ministerial posts.  
Overall, results indicate the need to contemplate multilevel dynamics of 
government in order to understand institutional arrangements in decentralised 
countries. Most importantly, these results may underpin a broader underlying 
institutional process: if multilevel dynamics affect regional cabinet size, which by 
nature has more constraints to grow or decrease, the effect is likely to be more intense 
for other institutions (public councils, bureaucratic officals, etc.). Future research will 
need to better disentangle these effects. 
In their recent stimulating work, Indriðason and Bowler argued that ‘much of the 
literature on coalition formation assumes that the size of the cabinet is fixed 
but…cabinets do change in size’ (2014: 381). By using the Spanish case, this article 
has represented a first step to shed light on this process at the regional level. Future 
research can certainly extend it further and include more decentralised countries, 
which should take into account more regions with a different degree of territorial 
decentralisation, or more contextual situations. Similarly, future studies can try to 
delve deeper and analyse under which circumstances regions create cabinet posts to 
target a specific policy domain, even if the regional government does not have a 
specific legal competence over it or if it is vaguely defined.  
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1
 The dataset and the replication materials are available at [LINK]. 
2
 Deviations from full proportionality have been the focus of recent research, see Bäck et al. (2011) 
or Falcó-Gimeno and Indriðason (2013). 
3
 This was the case of Navarre (1979), the Basque Country and Catalonia (1980), Galicia (1981) 
and Andalusia (1982). The case of Andalusia is special, since the region was finally included in the 
fast-track path after a period of elite and popular mobilisation in favour of self-government. 
4
 As compared to other decentralised states, Spanish ACs are characterised by a moderate level of 
regional self-government (behind federal states) and a very low level of shared-government. See RAI 
dataset (Marks et al. 2008). 
5
 El País’s yearbooks collect the composition of each regional cabinet on January 1 and, therefore, 
regional cabinets that lasted less than a natural year could not be covered. However, more than one 
reshuffle per year is not usual. We follow Falcó-Gimeno (2014) and data was double-checked using the 
database of the Observatorio de Gobiernos de Coalición (http://www.ub.edu/OGC/index_es.htm).  
6
 Ministers without a portfolio are highly uncommon and are only identified in the early years of 
regional governments.  
7
 Although the ministers at the Spanish regional level are named as consejeros (councillors), we 
stick to ‘ministers’. 
8
 It is important to focus on reshuffles as these new cabinets can imply changes in cabinet size and 
by not including them we would be losing relevant units of data. We follow a similar approach than 
Verzichelli (2008), who showed that reshuffles did not affect cabinet size in a different way than 
postelectoral cabinets. In our dataset, half of the cases (43.4%) correspond to reshuffled cabinets. 
Reshuffles are fairly distributed across regions (between 35-50% of each region’s observations 
correspond to reshuffles), which does not lead to some regions having more influence than others 
because of the number of observations by region (robustness checks weighting for the number of cases 
across regions provide the same results). 
9
 Region’s budgets were gathered from a variety of sources, including original budget laws, official 
regional gazettes or regional newspapers. We converted budget figures to Euros and adjusted them to 
inflation. In Spain, economic decentralisation is very low although there is an exception for the Basque 
Country and Navarra, which are allowed to collect their own taxes and give a portion to the central 
government in order to pay for activities such as Defence or Foreign Affairs. In the rest of the ACs, all 
taxes are levied and collected by or for the central government.     
10
 Data comes from the Spanish Ministry of Territorial Policy and is publicly available at the 
Ministry for Finances and Public Administration (http://www.seap.minhap.gob.es), accessed 28 
October 2014. Chaqués and Palau (2011) also include another category of transfers, relative to 
environmental protection and territorial management planning. Due to the nature of the transfers, we 
have considered them as welfare state policies. Disentangling both, however, provides the same results. 
Finally, Falcó-Gimeno (2014) did not include all regions in his analysis. We complemented the dataset 
following the same coding approach. Table B in the online appendix shows the concrete coding for 
each topic. 
11
Alternatively, we also computed an additional measure of congruence, which tackles the 
ideological (dis)similarity across levels of government. Further details and results, which are robust, 
can be found in the online appendix. 
12
 Sources: Political Opinion Barometer 746, April 2014. Catalan Statistics Institute (CEO, 
http://ceo.gencat.cat/).  Post-election Survey of the Basque Elections (ref. 2964), October 2012. Centre 
for Sociological Research (CIS, www.cis.es). Post-election Survey of the Galician Elections (ref. 
2958), September 2012. Post-election Survey of the Navarre Elections (ref. 3097), June 2015. Centre 
for Sociological Research (CIS, www.cis.es). 
13
 Operationalisation detailed in the online appendix. 
14
 One might think that decentralisation and congruence interact: with more powers, regions are 
more likely to act as they deem necessary and the central capacity to influence regional governments’ 
decisions is lower. This interaction, however, is not statistically significant.   
15
 See footnote 13.     
